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[L.A. No. 22499.

v.

DEXTER

In Bank.

[42 C.2d

Jan. 8, 1954.]

lVIARY DEXTER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. RAYl\10ND
C. DEXTER, Defendant and Appellant.
[1] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se.-A husband and
wife may contract with respect to their property ( Civ. Code,
§ 158), and if they are living separate and apart they may
provide for support and maintenance of either of them and
their children. ( Civ. Code, § 159.)
[2] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Modification of AllowanceEffect of Agreement of Parties.-As between husband and
wife, if provisions in an agreement by them for support and
maintenance have been made an integral or inseverable part
of division of their property, and court in a divorce action has
approved agreement, its provisions cannot thereafter be
modified without consent of both parties.
[3] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect
of Agreement. of Parties.-Where husband and wife enter into
agreement prior to divorce wherein they expressly state that
they intend finally to settle both division of their property
and their rights and duties with respect to support and maintenance, and each party waives "any and all right to support,
care and maintenance" other "than as expressly provided for
herein," the provision for monthly payments does not constitute a separable agreement for payment of alimony Sl'~bject
to continuing jurisdiction of court to modify.
[ 4] Id.- Permanent Alimony- Effect of Agreement of Parties:
Modification of Allowance.-Where husband and wife have
made a provision for support and maintenance an integral
part of their property settlement agreement, the monthly payments will ordinarily have a dual character; to the extent
that they are designed to discharg·e obligation of support and
maintenance they will ordinarily have indicia of alimony, but
to the extent that they represent a division of community
property itself, or constitute an inseparable part of consideration for property settlement, they are not alimony and accordingly cannot be modified without changing terms of property settlement agreement.
[1] See Cal.Jur., Husband and Wife, § 44 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Husband and Wife, § 252 et seq.
[2] See Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 643 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Husband and Wife,§ 154; [2, 3, 5-8]
Divorce, § 216(1); [4] Divorce, §§ 203, 216; [9] Husband and
Wife,§ 157(4); [10] Divorce,§§ 216, 234(2); [11] Divorce,§ 203;
[12] Divorce, § 179(3).
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!d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect
of Agreement of Parties.-\Vhere provision in property settlement agreement for monthly payments was expressly incorporated in interlocutory divoree decree and husband ordered
to perform it, but there had been no previous adjudication
that the monthly payments were alimony and interlocutory
decree itself did not purport to determine charaeter of payments, such provision did not become merged in decree so as
to be subject to modification pursuant to Civ. Code, § 139.
[6] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect
of Agreement of Parties.-In absence of an order for payment of alimony in interlocutory decree, or a reservation of
jurisdiction to make such an order in the future, court cannot,
after interlocutory decree has become final, add a provision
for alimony or modify amount of payments ordered pursuant to
a property settlement agreement.
[7] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect
of Agreement of Parties.-If wife was dissatisfied with her
contract whereby she had made support and maintenance provisions an integral part of settlement of property rights and
had tenable grounds for setting it aside, she should have attacked agreement before interlocutory divorce decree was
entered; she cannot, after having secured approval of agreement by court and having accepted benefits thereof, seek relief
inconsistent with its terms.
[8] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance-Effect
of Agreement of Parties.-lf wife agreed to accept less than
her share of community property in exchange for greater support and maintenance payments, it would be unjust to her
subsequently to hold that payments were alimony subject to
reduction on husband's motion.
[9] Husband and Wife-Transactions Inter Se-Property Settlement Agreements-Consideration.-Since at time a property
settlement agreement is made, the parties may be uncertain
as to which of their property is community rather than
separate, and they will ordinarily not know how court in
divorce action will find the facts or how it would, in absence
of an acceptable agreement, exercise its discretion in dividing
property and awarding alimony, the amicable adjustment of
these doubtful questions with respect to property and support and maintenance rights of the parties may alone supply
sufficient consideration to support their entire agreement.
[10] Divorce-Permanent Alimony-Modification of Allowance:
Disposition of Community Property.-Where plaintiff secured
her divorce on ground of extreme cruelty, had the parties not
settled their rights by agreement, court could in its discretion
have awarded plaintiff all of community property and less
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alimony than she received under her agreement, in which case
the alimony wonld hP snhjrct to reduction in event of changed
circumstances.
[11] !d.-Permanent Alimony-Effect of Agreement of Parties.Wife is entitled to agree to an equal division of community
property in exchange for support and maintenance payments
that cannot be reduced; accordingly, the fact that community
property is divided equally has no bearing on validity of provision of agreement whereby both parties waive all rights to
support and maintenance other than as provided therein.
[12] !d.-Counsel Fees and Costs-Pending AppeaL-On hearing
of divorced wife's petition for increase in amount of monthly
payments provided for in property settlement agreement and
awarded her by decree, trial court has jurisdiction to determine
character of payments involved; accordingly, divorce action is
still pending within meaning of Civ, Code, § 137.3, so as to
authorize court to order husband to pay wife's costs and attorney fees on appeal.

APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of I_jos Angeles County refusing divorced wife's petition to increase
amount of monthly payments awarded her by judgment, and
allowing attorney fees and costs on appeal. Louis H. Burke
and Lewis Drucker,"' Judges. Affirmed.
Hightower & Martin, Irving M. ·walker, John L. Martin,
and Mark Mullin for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Macfarlane, Schaefer & Haun and William Gamble for Defendant and Appellant.
TRAYNOR, J.-On May 25, 1944, plaintiff Mary Dexter
and her husband, defendant Raymond Dexter, executed an
agreement providing for the division of their community
property and the support and maintenance of plaintiff and
the children of the marriage. The agreement recited that
the parties were separated and had lived apart for some time,
that the separation appeared to be permanent, and that "The
said parties desire to effect a division of their community
property and to provide for the support and maintenance of
[plaintiff] and said children by friendly agreement, instead
of resorting to court for said purpose." It then provided
that certain enumerated property should be conveyed to and
become the separate property of plaintiff. The next para*Judge pro tern., assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.

,Jan. 1954]

DEXTER

v.

DEXTER

[ 42 C.2d 36; 265 P.2d 873]

graphs provided that "[Defendant] agrees to pay to [plaintiff] for her support and maintenance and the support of their
adult daughter and minor son, the sum of one hundred fifty
dollars ($150.00) per month . . . . In addition thereto first
party agrees to pay for the daughter's Sorority dues and other
expenses the sum of twenty-five ($25.00) per month, commencing June 1, 1944, and continuing thereafter so long as
said daughter remains an undergraduate in college, and unmarried, but not to exceed (2) years from June 1, 1944.
''When the minor son of the parties hereto leaves school
and goes to work, or when and if he goes into the military
forces of the United States, then the monthly payment of
[plaintiff] shall be decreased to one hundred dollars . . . .
"In addition to the above amounts, [defendant] agrees, at
his expense, to fix up the guest or maid's house at the premises
ab'ove described, and to repair the fence on said property.
"Upon the marriage of [plaintiff], all payments to her for
her support and maintenance shall cease, but the payments
for the minor son and daughter shall continue on the terms
hereinabove provided. Upon the death of [plaintiff], all
payments hereunder shall cease and [defendant] will assume
any obligation for the support of said children.
" ( 4) All money and property of the parties hereto, other
than that agreed to be conveyed to [plaintiff], shall be conveyed to [defendant], and shall become the separate property
of [defendant] . . . .
'' ( 6) Other than as expressly provided for herein, the
respective parties hereto do hereby release the other party
hereto respectively from any and all right of support, care
and maintenance, as the husband or wife, respectively, of the
other party. It is the intention of the parties hereto to make
a final settlement herein of all rights of support, care and
maintenance, one against the other, and to release the other
party respectively from all rights of such support, care and
maintenance other than as herein provided. . . .
" ( 8) Neither party hereto waives any cause of action for
divorce which he or she, respectively, has against the other
party hereto.
"In any action for divorce or maintenance hereafter brought
by either party, [plaintiff] waives any right to alimony, temporary or permanent, other than such amount as is provided
for hereinabove for her support.
" [Defendant] assumes and agrees to pay all attorneys fees
incurred by the parties hereto in the execution of this agree-
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ment and agrees to pay all court costs and reasonable counsel
fees iEcu:rred by [plaintiff] in any action for divorce which
she may file against [defendant.] ''
Shortly after this agreement was executed plaintiff filed an
action for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty. She
attached the agreement to the complaint and prayed that it
be approved, that defendant be directed to comply with it,
and that alimony be awarded in accordance with its terms.
Defendant defaulted and an interlocutory decree -vvas entered.
The decree approved the agreement, ordered defendant
to comply with it, and provided that pursuant to its terms,
''defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff monthly the
sum of $150.00 . . . commencing June 1, 1944; provided,
however, that ·when the son Norman Greenaway Dexter,
leaves school and goes to work, or when he goes into the
military forces of the United States, the said monthly
award shall be reduced to the sum of $100.00 per month.''
The decree also expressly incorporated the provision with
respect to the payment of $25 per month for the college expenses of the adult daughter of the parties. A final decree
was entered approximately one year later. In 1952 plaintiff
petitioned the court to increase the amount of the monthly
payments to $800 on the ground of changed circumstances.
The court entered its order refDsing modification on the
ground that it had no jurisdiction to modify the amount of
the payments. Plaintiff appealed and secured an order for
attorney fees and eosts on appeal, and defendant appealed
from the latter order.
Plaintiff contends that the payments ordered to be made
pursuant to the agreement are alimony subject to modification
by the eourt under section 139 of the Civil Code. Defendant,
on the other hand, contends that they constitute an integral
part of the property settlement agreement of the parties and
are not, therefore, subject to modification.
[1] A. husband and wife may contract with respect to
their property ( Civ. Code, § 158), and if they are living· Reparate and apart they may provide for the support and maintenance of either of them and their children. ( Civ. Code,
§ 159.) [2] Moreover, as between the husband and wife,
if the provisions for support and maintenance have been made
an integral or inseverable part of the division of their property, and the court in a eli vorce action has approved the agreement, its provisions eannot thereafter be modified without
the consent of both of the parties. (Tuttle v. Tuttle, 38 Cal.
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2d 419, 420-422 [240 P.2d 587]; Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d
621, 625 [177 P.2d 265); Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833,
841-842 [136 P.2d 1]; Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Cal.2d 172,
175-178 [44 P.2d 540); Sasanoff v. Sasanoff, 120 Cal.App.2d
120, 127 [260 P.2d 840); Hamilton v. Hamilton, 94 Cal.
App.2d 293, 299 [210 P.2d 750]; Alexander v. Alexander, 88
Cal.App.2d 724, 726-727 [199 P.2d 348] ; Holloway v. Holloway, 79 Cal.App.2d 44, 46-47 [179 P.2d 22); Kohl v. Kohl,
66 Cal.App.2d 535, 540-541 [152 P.2d 494]; Landres v. Rosasco, 62 Cal.App.2d 99, 105-106 [144 P.2d 20] ; Rich v. Rich,
44 Cal.App.2d 526, 530 [112 P.2d 780] .)
[3] It is clear that the parties executed such an agreement
in this case. They expressly stated that they intended finally
to settle both the division of their property and their rights
and duties with respect to support and maintenance, and each
party waived ''any and all right to support, care and maintenance" other "than as expressly provided for herein." It
would be contrary to the clearly expressed intention of the
parties to hold that the provision for monthly payments constituted a separable agreement for the payment of alimony
subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the court to modify.
Plaintiff contends, however, that since the monthly payments
were to terminate on her death or remarriage and were described as alimony in the prayer of her complaint, they should
be so treated. She points out that if they were intended as
a division of property it would have been more reasonable for
the agreement to provide that they should continue until a
given amount had been paid. These considerations would be
more persuasive if the issue presented was whether, on the
one hand, the monthly payments were solely part of a division
of the community property, or, on the other hand, solely
alimony. [4] When, as in this case, however, the parties
have made the provision for support and maintenance an
integral part of their property settlement agreement, the
monthly payments will ordinarily have a dual character. To
the extent that they are designed to discharg·e the obligation
of support and maintenance they will ordinarily reflect the
characteristics of that obligation and thus have the indicia
of alimony. (See P1tckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833, 838
[136 P.2d 1]; Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Cal.2d 172, 174 [44
P.2d 540) ; Kohl v. Kohl, 66 Cal.App.2d 535, 537 [152 P.2d
494] .) On the other hand, to the extent that they represent
a division of the community property itself, or constitute an
inseparable part of the consideration for the property settle-
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ment, they are not alimony, and accordingly cannot be modified without changing· the terms of the property settlement
agreement of the parties.
[5] Plaintiff contends, however, that when the provision
of the agreement for monthly payments was expressly incorporated into the interlocutory decree and defendant was ordered to perform it, it became merged in the decree, and that
therefore, under the rule stated in Ilmtgh v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d
605 [160 P.2d 15], it was subject to modification pursuant
to section 139 of the Civil Code. In the Hough case, however,
it had become res judicata that the payments there involved
were alimony and not an integral part of a property settlement. Accordingly, the court was not called upon to review
the correctness of that determination, and it held that an agreement for alimony that had been merged in a divorce decree
could no longer be enforced in an independent action. In the
present case, on the other hand, there has been no previous
adjudication in modification proceedings that the monthly payments are alimony. Moreover, the interlocutory decree itself
did not purport to determine the character of the payments.
It merely ordered defendant to make them pursuant to the
terms of the agreement and thus made clear that judgment
remedies including contempt would be available for the enforcement of his obligations.
[6] In the absence of an order for the payment of alimony
in the interlocutory decree, such as the order that had been
found to be present in the Hough case (see, also, Werner v.
Werne1·, 120 Cal.App.2d 248, 249-252 [260 P.2d 961] ;
Dunning v. Dunning, 114 Cal.App.2d 110, 114 [249 P.2d 609];
Pearman v. Pearman, 104 Cal.App.2d 250, 253 [231 P.2d 101] ;
W eeclon v. Weedon, 92 Cal.App.2d 367, 369-370 [207 P.2d
78] ; Gosnell v. Webb, 60 Cal.App.2d 1, 3-5 [139 P.2d 985]),
or a reservation of jurisdiction to make such an order in the
future, the court cannot, after the interlocutory decree has
become final, add a provision for alimony or modify the
amount of payments ordered pursuant to a property settlement agreement. [7] Accordingly, if plaintiff was dissatisfied with her contract whereby she had made the support
and maintenance provisions an integral part of the settlement of property rights and had tenable grounds for setting
it aside, she should have attacked the agreement before the
interlocutory decree was entered. She cannot, however, after
having secured its approval by the court and having accepted
the benefits thereof, now seek relief inconsistent with its terms.
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(Patton v. Patton, 32 Cal.2d 520, 523-524 [196 P.2d 909] ;
Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal.2d 621,627-628 [177 P.2d 265].)
In support of her motion for an increase in the monthly
payments, plaintiff filed an uncontradicted affidavit stating
that under their agreement the parties divided the community
property equally. She contends that a provision waiving all
support and maintenance except as is provided in a property
settlement agreement is invalid unless it is given in exchange
for a greater share of the community property than that to
·which the party would otherwise be entitled. Although it
·was that type of agreement that was present in the Adams case,
the rationale of that decision applies equally to other types
of integrated bargains. [8] Thus if the wife agreed to
accept less than her share of the community property in exchange for greater support and maintenance payments, it
·would be unjust to her subsequently to hold that the payments
were alimony subject to reduction on motion of the husband.
(See 1 Armstrong, California Family Law, p. 801.) [9] Moreover, at the time a property settlement is made, the parties
may be uncertain as to which of their property is community
rather than separate, and they will ordinarily not know how
the court in the divorce action will find the facts or how it
would, in the absence of an acceptable agreement, exercise its
discretion in dividing the property and awarding alimony.
'l'he amicable adjustment of these doubtful questions with
respect to the property and support and maintenance rights
of the parties may alone supply sufficient consideration to
support their entire agreement. (Bennett v. Bennett, 219
Cal. 153, 159 [25 P.2c1 426].) Thus in the present case, the
parties recited that they desired to settle their property and
support and maintenance rights "by friendly agreement, instead of resorting to court for said purpose.'' [10] Moreover, since plaintiff secured her divorce on the ground of
<'xtreme cruelty, had the parties not settled their rights by
agreement, the court could in its discretion have awarded
plaintiff all of the community property and less alimony than
Rhe r<~ceiYed under her agreement. In such case, however, the
alimony would be subject to reduction in the event of changed
cireumstances. [11] Plaintiff was entitled to agree instead
to an equal division of the community property in exchange
foe support and maintenance payments that could not be
reduced. Accordingly, the fact that the community property
was divided equally has no bearing on the validity of the
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provision of the agreement whereby both parties waived all
rights to support and maintenance other than as provided
therein. (T1dtlc v. Ttdtlc, 38 Oal.2c1419, 420 [240 P.2d 587];
Sasanoff v. Sasanojj, 120 Oal.App.2d 120, 127 [260 P.2d
840]; see, ah;o, Hamilton v. Hamilton, 94 Cal.App.2d 293,
299 [210 P.2d 750]; Holloway v. Holloway, 79 Oal.App.2d
44, 45-46 [179 P.2d 22] .)
[12] Defendant contends that if the payments are not
subjeet to modifieation, the court had no power to order him
to pay plaintiff's costs and attorney fees on appeal. 'fhe trial
eourt had jurisdietion, howeyer, to determine in this proeeeding the eharacter of the payments involved, and accordingly,
the divorce action is still pending within the meaning of section 137.3 of the Civil Code. (Lerner v. Snperior Court, 38
Cal.2d 676, 685 [242 P.2d 321]; Wilson v. Wilson, 33 Cal.2d
107, 115 [199 P.2d 671] .) Since plaintiff did not waive any
right ,;he might have to attorney fees and costs in her agreement and no abuse of discretion has been shown, the order
awarding costs and attorney fees on appeal must be affirmed.
'fhe orders are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Sehauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CART:BJR, J., Concnrring and Dissenting.-! concur in the
judgment affirming tho orders in this case but I disagree with
some of the reasoning leading thereto.
The trial court here entered its order refusing modification
of the support provisions incorporated in the interlocutory
and final decrees of divorce on the ground that it had no
jurisdiction to modify the amount of the payments.
Prior to entering its order, the trial court sustained defendant's objection to the introduction of evidence on the ground
that the rights of the parties were governed by their contract.
The majority here say that: ''The trial court had jurisdiction, however, to determine in this proceeding the character
of the payments involved, . . . " This is inconsistent with
its holding that the orclers are to be affirmed. If the trial
court could determine the character of the payments which
were provided for in the agreement entered into between the
parties, then it improperly sustained defendant's objection
to the introduction of evidence on that issue, and the case
should have been reversed. Not only is the majority opinion
in this case inconsistent in itself, but it is i.nc;Q{IJ'li:'ltent with
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the case of Fox v. Fox, post, p. 49 [265 P.2d 881], where
it was said: ''Plaintiff contends, however, that since the payments were labeled alimony, were to cease on her remarriage,
and were subject to modification in the event of a reduction
of defendant's pension, there is evidence to support the trial
court's implied finding that they were solely alimony subject
to modification. In the absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence, the interpretahon placed ~tpon the agt·eement by the
tTial cmrrt is not binding on this court on appeal . . . . " (Emphasis added.) The clear implication from this is that the
character of the payments is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court upon evidence offered by the parties
for that purpose. It is admitted that "there has been no
previous adjudication in modification proceedings that the
monthly payments are alimony. Moreover, the interlocutory
decree itself did not purport to determine the character of
the payments. It merely ordered defendant to make them
pursuant to the terms of the agreement and thus made clear
that judgment remedies including contempt would be available for the enforcement of his obligation.''
With the holding of the majority that this was a property
settlement agreement entered into between the parties which
the court had no power to modify, I agree. It is said that
plaintiff ''cannot, however, after having secured its approval
by the court and having accepted the benefits thereof, now
seek relief inconsistent with its terms.'' The factual situation here presented shows that the trial court approved the
agreement entered into between the parties in its entirety and
ordered that it be performed. It also shows that the support
provisions for plaintiff were ''pursuant to the terms of said
agreement'' set forth in the interlocutory decree of divorce
which was granted to the plaintiff. The rule in such a case
should be that if the entire agreement is approved by the court
and part of its provisions are incorporated in the decree and
ordered to be performed, those portions included in the decree
may be enforced by contempt proceedings. The balance of
the provisions, approved by the court but not incorporated
in the decree, may be enforced by separate action. It should
also be the rule that where the terms of a property settlement
or separation agreement or an agreement for support and
maintenance have been approved by the court as valid and
enforceable and incorporated in the decree, the court may
not, in that action, or in a later action, modify its terms and
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prov1s10ns. Once presented to the court, approved by it, incorporated in the decree and the performance thereof ordered,
the parties are bound by their agreement with respect to support and maintenance, or alimony, as the case may be.
There are several code provisions (§§ 158, 159, 175) which
all grant to the parties the right to contract with each other.
In the absence of fraud or overreaching there is no reason
why a contract providing for support and maintenance should
not be given the dignity accorded to other contracts. A
majority of this court accords that dignity to a property settlement agreement which provides for monthly payments but
holds that the trial court has power to determine the character
of the payments. In the present case that statement is a
non seqnittw since the majority sustains the trial court's action
in refusing to admit evidence concerning the character of the
payments. Where we disagree is that I believe that once the
parties have entered into an agreement whether it purports
to divide the property, or provide for support and maintenance
payments without a division of the property, which is found
to be fair and equitable, the subject is forever closed and the
parties are bound by the terms of their agreement. Incorporation in the decree has only the effect of making the remedy
on the judgment and not on the agreement which has become
merged therein. In the event of lack of incorporation, the
remedy is on the agreement which should have the same dignity
as other contracts.
In these three cases (Dexter v. Dexter, Fox v. Fox, Flynn
v. Flynn) this court had an opportunity to clarify the law
so that stability might be given to property settlement agreements and agreements for support and maintenance. Not
only do the majority holdings in th.ese three cases not settle
the law, but they add untold confusion. The import of the
Flynn decision is that an appellate court may order a property
settlement agreement, which is not even in the record, attached
to a judgment of divorce after that judgment has become
final. As I pointed out in my dissent there, there was no
adequate incorporation and the parties should have resorted
to an action on the agreement itself for the sum and substance
of their rights and duties, it having been approved by the
court in the divorce action. The import of this case is that
the question of the character of the payments involved in the
agreement of the parties now merged in the divorce decree is
a question of fact for the trial court which it may determine
without any evidence on the subject other than the agreement
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itself. This result naturally flows from its affirmance of the
trial court's action in refusing to admit plaintiff's evidence
on the subject. 'l'he logical inference, of course, to be drawn
from the action of the trial court is that it impliedly considered the agreement to be one of property settlement. Then
we have the Fox ease wherein it is said that in the absence
of conflicting extrinsic evidence the finding of the trial court
on the character of the payments is not binding on an appellate court. If no evidence is necessary, or admissible, then
this court, or any District Court of Appeal, may make its
ovH1 determination as to the character of the payments agreed
upon by and between the spouses to the end that litigation
in these matters will be endless and the law on the subject
Yvill be without any stability whatsoever. As I pointed out in
my dissent in the Flynn case, how will attorneys know how
to advise, or act for, their clients in cases of this kind? The
obvious answer is that they will not have the remotest idea
whether to incorporate the entire agreement in haec verba, or
in substance, or attach it physically to the decree of divorce
or whether, no matter how it is done, the trial court, or any
appellate court will not determine that if monthly payments
are provided for those payments constitute alimony subject
to modification.
Left open in the majority opinions in all three cases, but
there by implication, is whether the parties may contract
with each other as to alimony, or support and maintenance,
where no property division as such is involved. If the parties
agree on a certain sum to be paid monthly, or annually, or
semiannually, in lieu of any lump sum provision, that agreement, if fair and equitable, should have the same stability
as where there has been a division of property by agreement.
So far as alimony per se is concerned, if the parties cannot
or for some reason do not themselves reach an amicable agreement on the subjeet, the trial court has the power to make
such provision in the decree. In this event, the amount would,
of eourse, be subject to modification under the continuing
jurisdiction of the court. Why the parties should not be
able to make a binding agreement for the payment of alimony
or money purely for support and maintenance, is not made
clear by the majority.
The majority opinion in each of these cases leaves the
obvious implication that if such an agreement is incorporated in the decree, its provisions will be subject to modifi-
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cation, but if it is not so incorporated, it may not be modified.
This implication follows from the majority holding that if
the agreement is incorporated, the court has power to determine the character of the payments, that is, whether they are
for alimony or a part of a property settlement. Why the
difference? Is not a fair, just and valid agreement to pay
alimony or support money just as binding as one which also
contains provisions for a property settlement? Either agreement could provide for its modification under specified conditions. But in the absence of such provision it would remain
unchanged. \Vhy should not such an agreement for alimony
alone be binding on the court if it is incorporated in the
decree and approved?
My position is that if the parties have agreed to a division
of their property, or for support and maintenance for one
of them without a property division, and that agreement
has been approved by the court as fair and equitable, whether
incorporated in the decree or not, their agreement sets forth
the full sum of their rights and obligations and may not be
modified without a subsequent agreement made by them. If
they have not agreed on support and maintenance, the court
may, upon application, provide for alimony which is then
subject to modification under the rules applicable thereto,
or if they have not agreed upon a property division the trial
court may, on trial of the divorce action, divide the property
of the parties in accord with settled principles of law applicable to the case.
I would affirm the order refusing modification in this case
because the parties had, by their agreement, the pertinent
provisions of which were incorporated in the decrees of
divorce and approved by the court as fair and equitable,
set forth their rights and liabilities. With respect to defendant's appeal from the order granting plaintiff her attorneys'
fees, defendant agreed in the agreement entered into between
the parties to pay all attorneys' fees and costs incurred by
plaintiff in any action for divorce which might be filed. The
agreement contains no waiver on the part of plaintiff as to
any further attorneys' fees, and the order granting such
fees should be sustained inasmuch as any allowance therefor
is discretionary with the trial court and there is here no
claim of abuse of that discretion.

